Book Reviews

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Book Reviews

Segno e simbolo in Wittgenstein
Marco Carapezza
Acireale: Bonanno Editore, 2006
Reviewed by Alessandro Capone, *University of Palermo*

Wittgenstein is one of those authors for whom there has been a plethora of philosophical attempts at exegesis, offering a very diversified (and stratified) picture: the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*, the intermediate Wittgenstein, the one of the *Untersuchungen* and the one of the last writings (*Letzte Schriften*). This volume by Carapezza stresses the continuity underlying Wittgenstein's various works, in line with recent thinking about him. The book has five chapters: the first four are devoted to the *Tractatus* and the fifth to the *Untersuchungen*. A short introduction reviews some aspects of the debate on the sign and the symbol in authors such as Frege and Russell who belong to the semiotic tradition.

Chapter 1 presents an original reanalysis of the notion of 'image' ('Bild') in the *Tractatus* in the light of the formulations of the *Prototractatus*, according to which we conceive facts as images (or pictures). The images or pictures referred to by Wittgenstein are necessarily logical, otherwise they could not be thought of; they describe facts in the world sharing the logical form of their representation. Images or pictures as we normally conceive of them are a subset of these, characterized by their representational features. Other logical pictures, utterances, have a linguistic dimension. An utterance is an image or a picture because it describes a fact in the world sharing the logical form of the representation. Like all pictures, utterances can be articulated, that is, they have an internal organization and can be either true or false.

Carapezza shows how the concept of 'picture' in Wittgenstein depends first of all on the picture drawn, and secondly on the mathematical image (p. 35). Most scholars interpret the relationship between the picture and the fact in terms of isomorphism. Isomorphism, however, is a biunivocal relationship, connecting in this case the proposition and the fact represented, and vice versa. Carapezza, instead, believes that being biunivocal is too strong a requisite for describing such a relationship and proposes to replace the notion of isomorphism with that of homomorphism. Like isomorphism, homomorphism is a relationship of structural similarity between two sets which preserves properties and relations, but it is not biunivocal. Criticism of the

interpretation of the language–world relationship in terms of isomorphism is the most important contribution of this book and allows Carapezza to hold the position that even from the point of view of this relationship the differences between the *Tractatus* and the *Untersuchungen* are less remarkable than usually believed.

In Chapters 2 and 3 Carapezza analyzes in detail the notions of 'sign' and 'symbol' in Wittgenstein, showing that the philosopher makes idiosyncratic use of the latter. His notion does not correspond to the semiotic conception of it, according to which a symbol is a particular type of sign, nor to the mathematical one, according to which a symbol is a variable. For Wittgenstein sign and symbol are the members of a symbolic relationship in which there is codetermination between the two.

Chapter 4 focuses on one of the features that characterize the picture: the articulation, that is the logical organization of the signs that determine the proposition. The discussion of symbol and articulation addresses the issue of the non-reducibility of a proposition to its constitutive signs. In Chapter 5, Carapezza tries to throw light on Wittgenstein's interest in animal cognitive mechanisms through the notion of 'form of life' ('Lebensform'), which is employed to compare the various ways in which human language works. Carapezza concludes that language is not an instrument of communication but a window on the way the human mind works.

The Chinese-English Dictionary (3rd edition)
Wu Guanghua (ed.)
Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2010
Reviewed by Du Kaihuai, *Xiamen (Amoy) University*

Vintage Wu Guanghua, *The Chinese–English Dictionary* (1st edition) (henceforth CED1) is an unabridged general bilingual dictionary aimed toward Chinese translators'/learners' encoding tasks, with due consideration for foreign visitors' needs in Chinese. Published in 1993, CED1 is designated as an integration of general and encyclopaedic functions and ranks as the largest and most comprehensive Chinese-English dictionary with its extensive coverage of the general lexicon, specific terminologies, idiomatic expressions and a well-chosen reservoir of archaic/foreign/ dialectical expressions. Facing the growing imbalance between lexicographical stability and linguistic dynamics due to dramatic changes in society and in language, Wu offered to take up prompt updating after the début of CED1, leading to the birth of CED2 in 1999. The work under review here is *The Chinese-English Dictionary* (3rd edition) (henceforth CED3), released in January 2010.

A bilingual dictionary is defined as one 'which relates the vocabulary of two languages together by means of translation equivalents' (Hartmann & James 1998: 14) and translation is to a bilingual dictionary what definition is to a monolingual dictionary. Therefore the revision of a bilingual dictionary inevitably involves the correcting or polishing of flaws in previous editions. The revisers have scrutinized

CED1 and CED2, inviting and incorporating feedback from many lay users and professional critics, and the result is a significant and adequate amendment in this new edition. CED3 has come to value the use of foreignization over that of domestication in translating items coloured with Chinese culture and context (allusions and folklore alike), which indicates the compilers' advocacy of cultural diversity and heralds the potential for an output of cultural capital from China as a result.

Compared with its current peers, CED3 has at least three merits: 1) the inheritance of positive features from earlier editions; 2) revisions in response to identified problems; and 3) the piloting of ingenious devices. The popularity of CED1 and CED2 can be accounted for due to their considerable emphasis on encoding-orientation and user-friendliness and these are adequately preserved and further enhanced in CED3. This new edition, however, outperforms them in terms of number of entries and subject coverage and will surely prove more desirable and useful to its users given the addition of some 15,000 new entries/senses/uses and the revision of some existing ones. Neologisms collected from various sources, included on the basis of linguistic stability and pragmatic productivity, are selected and properly treated in CED3. The inclusion of current neologisms constitutes and remains the routine motive and practice for dictionary revision, yet CED3 deserves special credit for its sensitivity to loanwords such as 宅男 'otaku' and 宅女 'otaku girl' (both from Japanese). Many expressions find their début in CED3 and its expansion and revisions should aid users in negotiating the many challenges posed by translation/interpreting work.

Language is characterized on the one hand by variation as a communicative potential and on the other by adaptation in actual use. Lexicography can be viewed as a special kind of language use or, to be more specific, as lexicographical communication (Zhang & Yong 2007), in which lexicographers observe and describe the variations and user adaptation to those variations. Therefore descriptivism and pragmatism in lexicography postulate that variation, once comparatively stabilized, should be reflected in dictionaries. Variation recorded in dictionary compiling/revision typically manifests itself with, in addition to the inclusion of new words, the refreshing and enlarging of senses/uses of entry headwords. For example, CED3 indicates that 步行 'go on foot; walk' functions as a modifier to form new compound phrases, 步行街 'pedestrian street' and 步行天桥 'pedestrian overpass'. New senses, mainly figurative ones, are added to headwords or illustrations, as in 充电 'update one's knowledge, brush up'. These revisions aim at maintaining an enduring timeliness and an exhaustive treatment of each word, which are necessary to sustain the dictionary as a sophisticated reference tool.

The establishing and arranging of equivalents in bilingual lexicography is notorious for its demanding drudgery, and is responsible for the lion's share of criticism concerning dictionary quality. It is particularly the case for Chinese–English lexicographers, due to the vagueness of parts of speech in the language and the multiple meanings of many Chinese characters. Wu responded to these challenges in

the previous editions of CED with an unprecedented bilingual sense-differentiating device based on discriminated parts of speech. The discrimination and labelling of parts of speech are done on the basis of English equivalents. This practice is maintained and refined in CED3. Definitions/interpretations and translations are categorized under different headings accommodating the form, function and content of each character. Such labelling of parts of speech is limited to single-character entries in CED3 as a tentative trial of its usefulness. This innovation has two potential advantages in lexicography, the accuracy of interlingual equating and the convenience for locating senses/uses, and will certainly enrich the instructiveness and specificity of entry information, thereby transforming the traditional dictionary into a learner's dictionary. The treatment of multi-character headwords is another noteworthy inheritance. For simple monosemous phrases, English equivalents are offered with or without exemplification, depending on their cognitive construability; for polysemous or learned or dialectal monosemous phrases, additional interpretations are offered.

CED3 invests a lot of effort in putting forth a user-friendly interface, which is its overall goal. Unlike the generally unified word-based lemmatization and ordering by word-initial sequence in English-Chinese or English monolingual dictionaries, the building and organizing of headword lists in Chinese-English dictionaries has remained the Gordian knot for lexicographers. CED3 takes up the character-based headword listing approach, as well as four entry access alternatives (by syllable, pinyin, radical or stroke) and coordinates these with orthoepic and orthographical elements, which taken together optimizes the arrangement of macrostructure and the accessibility of microstructure.

CED3 still has some minor flaws and it is incumbent upon lexicographers to treat issues of metalanguage and metacognition in the future when tackling these remaining defects. For example, to produce a more practically inclusive and scientifically balanced headword list, customized corpora and versatile search-engines like Google and Baidu could be utilized for checking idiomaticity, register distribution and frequency of use of equivalents. Also, I would advise that electronic or/and online versions be made available in order to facilitate easier portability, greater utility and, more importantly, the interactive dynamicity that is expected in our technology-rich world.

The creators of CED3 deserve much more credit than criticism for their holistic approach to this new edition. It is a significant contribution to lexicographic practice and will fulfil its role as a means of removing the intercultural barriers that often impede language exchange.

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Second Language Vocabulary Acquisition (Linguistic Insights: Studies in Language and Communication Vol. 79)
Qing Ma
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009, 333 pp.
Reviewed by Christo Moskovsky and Soheila Damandan, *University of Newcastle*

Second language (SL) vocabulary knowledge is undeniably an essential part of SL competence, which is why it is not surprising that SL researchers have in recent years been increasingly interested in issues of SL lexical acquisition. The book under review is one of the latest additions to a growing body of published work on this topic. It critically considers important linguistic, psycholinguistic and socio-cultural dimensions of the acquisition of SL vocabulary, and also specifically looks at the state of affairs of the learning and teaching of SL vocabulary in China.

The book is organized into four main parts and consists of 13 chapters (the last chapter being a 'General Conclusion'), a couple of appendices and an index. The first part is devoted to a general introduction to SL vocabulary acquisition, and presents some of the key concepts in the field, such as declarative vs. procedural knowledge, long-term vs. short-term memory, receptive vs. productive vocabulary knowledge and breadth vs. depth of vocabulary knowledge. This part also presents relevant influential theories such as Levelt's (1989) lemma/lexeme model of lexical composition and Jiang's (2000) three-stage model of lexical acquisition. Part 2 deals with implicit and explicit approaches to lexical acquisition and the importance of multiword items, as well as the role of various learner-internal factors like motivation and aptitude. Part 3 is concerned with computer-assisted vocabulary learning, offering, for the first time, a comprehensive framework for investigating the role that computer-based technology can play in the attainment of SL vocabulary knowledge. This part includes an extremely useful critical review of some major vocabulary learning software packages, with a focus on their strengths and weaknesses. Part 4 is devoted to lexical acquisition by Chinese learners of English as a foreign language (EFL), who are estimated to be as many as 300 million. In view of such a staggering number, the need for an approach to SL vocabulary acquisition specifically designed for this population of language learners hardly has to be justified. This part also reports on the author's own research investigating vocabulary acquisition strategies used by Chinese EFL learners.

The book is very well written and involves a very clear and well-structured presentation demonstrating the author's solid grasp of this field of knowledge. One nevertheless feels that some issues of key significance for SL lexical acquisition have not been tackled in sufficient depth. With regard to the nature of SL acquisition, Ma seems to have followed Krashen's (1985 and elsewhere) Monitor Theory and his concept of COMPREHENSIBLE INPUT. This essentially nativist approach to acquisition places a significant burden on the perceptive/interpretive component of language: in Ma's words, 'listening becomes the most important form of language input' (p. 82). This is a controversial position which has not been supported adequately. As major

studies in bilingualism show [see Baker (2006) and the sources cited there], competence in the receptive skills does not necessarily lead to the development of productive skills in the target language. It seems that having rich opportunities to use the language productively in appropriate social contexts is essential for the attainment of the productive aspect of language; otherwise a largely passive/receptive type of competence emerges. This seems to be in accord with Swain's (1985) COMPREHENSIBLE OUTPUT hypothesis. Another way to approach the receptive/ productive dichotomy is in terms of the distinction between C-representations and P-representations of lexical items (Clark 1993). The former can be seen as the set of phonological, morphological and semantic features comprising a word, while the latter, in addition to the same set of features, also involve a set of articulatory procedures. The formation of C-representations can be accounted for by reference to listening, but in view of the nature of P-representations it is not clear at all whether their formation can be explained in terms of listening alone. In Clark's model of first language lexical acquisition children often develop defective P-representations, which they eventually fix by comparing their own faulty output with the 'perfect' input coming from surrounding adults; if this assumption is correct, using the language productively is essential for the development of P-representations (and productive skills generally).

Another extremely important issue, which has very substantial implications for acquisition theory, concerns the interface between the lexicon and inflectional morphology. Do lexical items exist in inflected form in the mental lexicon or do they get inflected in the process of derivation? We can see this as one of the most fundamental 'philosophical' questions of contemporary linguistic theory. Ma has not explicitly committed herself to either position, but the way she has treated some of her data would suggest that she subscribes to the former. Needless to say, taking one position or another will inevitably have major consequences for all aspects of lexical acquisition theory, which is why such a position would have to be clearly articulated and justified.

The role that the learner's first language plays in the acquisition of non-primary languages remains one of the central issues in current SL acquisition theory. Ma has presented a wide range of data which strongly suggest that first language TRANSFER is a major force in the process of SL lexical acquisition. In light of this it would seem that a theory of SL vocabulary acquisition is incomplete without a theory of lexical transfer.

It probably needs to be emphasized that, while the importance of vocabulary knowledge for SL acquisition cannot be denied (for obvious reasons), it should not be overstated either. A strong argument could be made that in the absence of any grammatical competence SL vocabulary knowledge would be close to useless.

As far as Qing Ma's own research on lexical acquisition is concerned, we take the view that it constitutes a valuable contribution to the field and should have been given more prominence in the book. We would also recommend that the findings of

her studies be related to language teaching/learning practices and to the question of how these can be improved.

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Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture

GEOFFREY HUGHES

Oxford & Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, xi + 320 pp.

Reviewed by Pedro J. CHAMIZO DOMÍNGUEZ, *University of Malaga*

It is commonplace nowadays to say we live in days of political correctness. And political correctness has gained currency in our social and linguistic usages so much that someone's intellectual and personal prestige depends many times not on what one says, but on what one says being expressed according to the canons of what is considered politically correct. However, the phenomenon of political correctness has many dimensions—mainly linguistic and cultural—and is not new at all. It can be dated back to the origins of humankind itself.[1] Geoffrey Hughes's *Political Correctness* deals with both its history and its use at present, and he deals with both aspects in a masterly fashion. Consequently, this book is highly recommendable because of what it says as well as (what is probably more important) because of the multitude of suggestions and questions it inspires. In fact, this review will mainly deal with what the book inspired in me. To start with, my interest in the topic has its roots both in the fact that politically correct terms make up a proper subset of euphemisms and in the fact that political correctness can be considered a universal.

The first point means that, while any politically correct term can be considered a euphemism with regard to the forbidden or inconvenient word, many euphemisms cannot be properly included under the label 'politically correct term'. Terms for bodily effluvia, for reproduction and death, for diseases, etc. are candidates to become

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[1] 'Although the phrase "politically correct" can be traced back to a remote early instance by Justice James Wilson in a Supreme Court case in 1793' (p. 61), [it] 'started as a policy concept denoting the orthodox party line of Chinese Communism as enunciated by Mao Tse-Tung in the 1930s. [...] Paradoxically, political correctness increased in vogue in America precisely when hard-line Communism was waning' (p. 60).

forbidden words and consequently they are in need of euphemistic substitutes. But these terms cannot be considered politically incorrect by themselves. For instance, one can euphemistically refer to masturbation as *Irish wedding*, but the noun *masturbation* is not politically incorrect at all. In fact, *masturbation* is an orthophemism. What is politically incorrect is precisely its euphemism.

As for the second point, the fact that political correctness changes from one culture to another, from one language to another, from one epoch to another, or from a given social group to another leads me to argue that political correctness can be considered a cultural/linguistic universal. In other words, and glossing Pascal's well-known statement 'Vérité en deçà des Pyrénées, erreur au-delà' ('Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side') (Pascal 1670/1977: 87), one could say 'Political correctness on this side of the Pyrenees, political incorrectness on the other side'. What changes is what is considered politically correct, not political correctness itself. This means that many expressions must be changed according to what is considered politically correct in each moment. For instance, the original version of the French saying *Parler français comme une Basque espagnole* (literally, 'To speak French like a Spanish Basque') was later replaced by *Parler français comme une vache espagnole* ('To speak French like a Spanish cow'), perhaps in order to avoid an ethnic slur.[2]

The book includes four main parts, each of them divided into two chapters, which in turn are divided into several sections or sub-chapters. Part I, 'Political correctness and its origins', which includes the chapters 'Defining political correctness' (pp. 3–59) and 'The origins of the debate' (pp. 60–84), introduces the topic both from historical and current viewpoints. Part II, 'The semantic aspect', which contains the chapters 'Words and authorities: dictionaries and lexicographers' (pp. 87–105) and 'The evolution of the word field' (pp. 106–111), includes the study of about 200 items arranged chronologically. Part III, 'Zones of controversy', including the chapters 'Issues of race, nationality, and difference' (pp. 115–177) and 'Agendas old and new' (pp. 178–214), is the main part of the book and studies what is usually considered the target of political correctness by antonomasia, i.e. the ways of naming others in order to avoid ethnic slurs. And finally, Part IV, 'Cultural and historical issues', contains the chapters 'Political correctness in the past' (pp. 217–235) and 'Culture' (pp. 236–282), in which earlier instances of political correctness are examined, going back to Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, and its relation to culture and multiculturalism. This last part is, in my opinion, particularly interesting, since it patently shows that, in spite of the fact that the term is recent, the subject itself is very old. What changes from one culture to another or from one historical epoch to another is not the phenomenon

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[2] Given our current rules of political correctness it is highly probable that Descartes would have censored himself and not have written the following: 'Ceux qui on le raisonnement le plus fort, et qui digèrent le mieux leurs pensées, afin de les rendre claires et intelligibles, peuvent toujours le mieux persuader ce qu'ils proposent, *encore qu'ils ne parlassent que bas-breton*, et qu'ils n'eussent jamais appris de rhétorique' ('Those who have the strongest power of reasoning, and who most skilfully arrange their thoughts in order to render them clear and intelligible, have the best power of persuasion even *if they can but speak the language of Lower Brittany* and have never learned rhetoric') (Descartes 1637/1973: 7, my emphasis).

itself, but what is considered politically correct. This means that, from time to time, past times themselves are censored according to our current criteria of political correctness, as happened with the characteristic pipe of the French film director Jacques Tati or with Jean-Paul Sartre's omnipresent cigarettes (p. 52), as well as with classic masterpieces of literature (Chamizo Domínguez 2009: 431).

In addition, the book contains seven other parts: (1) a 'Preface' (pp. viii–xi), in which the author summarizes the three aims of his work, namely, the origin, progress, content and style of political correctness from the opening salvos of the academic debate in the United States to its recent global manifestations; (2) the usual page of 'Acknowledgments' (p. xii); (3) one page entitled 'Epigraphs' (p. xiii), where Hughes gives nine wise quotations on the topic of his book; (4) a 'Conclusion' entitled 'The right thing to do? Progressive orthodoxy, empty convention or double standard?' (pp. 283–297); (5) an ample 'Bibliography' (pp. 298–308); (6) a useful 'Author and subject index' (pp. 309–316); and (7) a 'Word index' (pp. 317–320).

As the reader can infer from the two previous paragraphs, Hughes's book exhaustively covers many aspects of the topic of political correctness, and the author adopts a scrupulous, academic method to treat it. This makes its reading highly recommendable, particularly by people who practise the kind of double standard which consists in publicly avoiding what one privately thinks and says. And this is particularly notable in politicians' speeches. An instance of what I mean recently occurred when, on 27 April 2010 and alluding to a lady voter who was complaining about immigration, Gordon Brown stated off-air, 'She's just a *bigoted woman*' (my emphasis), after talking with her for a while. Similarly, the former President of the Spanish Autonomous Region of Castilla-La Mancha and current President of the Spanish Parliament, José Bono, described Tony Blair as 'un gilipollas integral' ('a complete dickhead') on 16 March 2004, when he thought that nobody could hear him. Now, one can assume that Gordon Brown and José Bono really thought that Mrs Duffy and Mr Blair actually were a 'bigoted woman' and a 'gilipollas integral', respectively. Consequently, political correctness is not only a matter of a double standard but also a matter of a 'calculated category-mistake—or rather . . . a happy and revitalizing, even if bigamous, second marriage'—using the witty expression of Goodman (1968: 73) when speaking of metaphors,[3] or a 'flouting' of the maxim of Quality, using Grice's notion (1975/1989: 34). And this is so because unspeakable and consequently censored words cannot be substituted for by other words without real loss of meaning, given the fact that complete and exact synonyms occur very rarely in a given language.

This censoring of language which political correctness consists of can be found even in academic contexts and its consequence is, obviously, that authors cannot say what they really mean. For example, Allan and Burridge (1986: 232) witness how the editor of one of their books banned two well-known four letter words within the title of the book, even in their euphemistic forms: 'And our editor at Oxford University

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[3] Goodman borrowed the expression 'category-mistake' from Ryle (1949: 16ff).

Press firmly discouraged a suggestion that f--- and even sh-t (never mind the full spellings) should occur within the title of this book'. I am able to add another instance of this. On the occasion of a lecture at the University of Prešov (Slovakia) on euphemisms and dysphemisms, and when trying to illustrate the impossibility of replacing a given word by any synonym without changing its register and implicature, I used the instance of four synonyms of *tits*: *breasts*, *bust*, *udders*, and *mammary glands*. I argued that none of them can be replaced by any other and achieve the same cognitive effect because we expect to meet *breasts* and *bust* within erotic and/or aesthetic contexts, *udders* when referring to the teats of quadruped mammals, especially dairy cows or goats, and finally *mammary glands* in medical or biological contexts. Consequently, the term *udders* cannot be used to refer to a human female's mammary glands without running the risk of achieving some marked derogatory flavour or being politically incorrect. Conversely, the term *bust* usually has some eulogistic flavour since it is normally predicated of actresses' and models' bosoms. When I arrived at that point of my talk my translator refused to continue translating, arguing that she could not publicly pronounce such unspeakable words and, if she did, her academic prestige would be eroded or something worse would happen. Needless to say, my argument was destroyed.

To add insult to injury, author guidelines dare to suggest (supposed) synonyms where they actually do not exist and, consequently, oblige authors to say what they never wanted to mean. I shall allude here to an exemplary instance I analysed in a previous paper (Chamizo Domínguez 2009: 429–430). It deals with the adjective *seminal*, which the 'Guidelines on anti-sexist language' of The British Sociological Association bans. In its place, this wise association recommends that the adjective in question be replaced by supposed synonyms such as *classical* or *formative*. This is not only an instance of censoring, but also an instance of linguistic ignorance, for three reasons at least. Firstly, because it is quite difficult to find actual synonyms in a given natural language; most of the time (if not always) what we usually call *synonyms* are not such but instances of paronyms, hyperonyms or hyponyms (Casas Gómez 2002: 86–124). Secondly, because neither *classical* nor *formative* is synonymous with *seminal*, even if we accept the existence of synonyms in a given natural language.[4] And thirdly, because the notion that *seminal* is a sexist adjective can only be explained by appealing to a misunderstanding of its etymology, since, in spite of the fact that the English adjective *seminal* derives ultimately from the Latin noun *semen*, this Latin noun originally meant any kind of seed (mainly vegetal seeds) and only by means of metonymy did it come to mean the viscid whitish fluid of the male reproductive tract consisting of spermatozoa suspended in secretions of accessory glands.

My previous reflection leads me to connect politically correct terms or expressions with ambiguity and vagueness. In this regard, my argument can be summarized as

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[4] In fact, Fergusson's (1986) *Penguin Dictionary of English Synonyms and Antonyms* does not provide any entry for the adjective *seminal*. In contrast the *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* (2010) provides *creative* and *original* as synonyms of *seminal*. Again one can ask oneself whether *creative* and *original* are synonyms or hyperonyms of *seminal*.

follows: as with euphemisms, politically correct terms work as such if they maintain some calculated ambiguity. When ambiguity disappears such terms become politically incorrect *ipso facto*. Hughes himself provides us with a paradigmatic example, '*industrial action* [...] as a substitute formula to avoid the negative connotations of *strike*' (p. 17, original emphasis). I completely agree with Hughes when he comments that *industrial action* 'is generally regarded as an example of cynical double-speak' (p. 17). In addition, I would argue that *industrial action* is more politically correct than *strike* because the first term is ambiguous while the second one is not: *industrial action* is, in a free context, ambiguous since it could mean government programmes for creating or promoting factories or things like that. Soviet 'Five-Year Plans for the National Economy' or Nazi Germany's 'Four-Year Plan' could perfectly well be referred to as *industrial actions*, probably more reasonably than a strike. On the other hand, how could we refer to a strike in fishery, agricultural or educational areas given the fact that, properly speaking, such activities are not 'industrial'? Do we have to, by analogy, coin terms such as *fishing action, **agricultural action* and *education action?

The prohibition of smoking provides many fruitful examples of ambiguous, politically correct terms. One finds from time to time signs such as 'Tobacco free' or 'Thank you for not smoking' instead of the classical, precise, and clear 'No smoking'. With regard to 'Tobacco free' someone can think that this means that somebody is offering or providing tobacco for free and/or without restriction. The case of 'Thank you for not smoking' provides us with an instance of ambiguity related to an indirect speech act. Indeed, what 'Thank you for not smoking' literally says is that someone is thanking us for not smoking, but it does not mean that smoking is forbidden. Someone who is not cooperative and smokes after reading or hearing 'Thank you for not smoking' can argue in his/her favour that s/he thought that smoking was allowed although not recommended. This means that the usual implicature of 'Thank you for not smoking' can be cancelled if the hearer is not (or does not want to be) cooperative, since its import is only that someone is grateful if you don't smoke.

The issue of race probably is the most frequent matter for political correctness and, in fact, Hughes devotes the longest chapter of the book to it. Again, ambiguity becomes essential in order to be politically correct. Perhaps the best candidate for illustrating political correctness when dealing with race and ethnic slurs is the noun *black*. Nowadays the noun *black* is a clear instance of a politically incorrect term, at least in the United States. Further, *white* has become politically incorrect as well. Accordingly, the noun and adjective *Caucasian* have become the politically correct terms for *white*. As a result of this, ambiguity appears in many contexts. Indeed, *Caucasian* means: (1) 'of or relating to the Caucasus or its inhabitants'; and (2) 'of, constituting, or characteristic of a race of humankind native to Europe, North Africa, and southwest Asia and classified according to physical features—used especially in referring to persons of European descent having usually light skin pigmentation' (*Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary*, accessed 7 May 2010). Given such polysemy of *Caucasian*, on the occasion of the terrorist attack on Moscow's

Metro, the English edition of *Pravda* (http://english.pravda.ru/) reported that the Moscow law-enforcement agency was searching for 'a man in his 30s, with distinct Caucasian (*from Caucasus*) facial characteristics, with sharp nose, chubby lips, clean-shaved, wearing a dark leather hat with fake fur' (my emphasis). The need for this parenthesis is particularly enlightening as it makes clear that the Moscow police were not searching for any white person, but for a person from the Caucasus region, whose physical features probably do not fit the features one expects to find in 'literally' white people.

Concerning ethnic slurs, sometimes the use of a noun becomes politically incorrect, but the same word as an adjective is not. In Spanish the use of nouns such as *gitano/gitana* ('gypsy') or *chino/china* ('Chinese person') in isolation are systematically avoided by politicians and the media, who usually refer to Gypsies and Chinese people as *de etnia gitana* ('of the Gypsy ethnic group') and *de nacionalidad china* ('of Chinese nationality') respectively. In other words, the current canons of political correctness demand using some nouns as adjectives, probably because an adjective seems to be a less important grammatical category than its cognate noun. Needless to say, the noun *moro/mora* ('Moor') is systematically avoided by both the media and politicians. Instead of *moro/mora* the media prefer *magrebí* ('Maghrebian'), mainly as an adjective, sometimes leading to amusing category mistakes. For instance, as a result of the avoidance of the noun *magrebí* one can find from time to time utterances like 'cuando los dos obreros, uno de nacionalidad magrebí con pasaporte francés, y otro rumano' ('when both workers, one of Maghrebian nationality with a French passport, and the other a Rumanian').[5] This quote has several and varied category mistakes. The Maghreb is not the name of a country but the name of an area which includes countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania at least, and, consequently, nobody can enjoy any 'Maghrebian nationality'. On the other hand, if the person in question was the bearer of a French passport, his nationality is, obviously, French. It is notable that it is permitted to use the noun *rumano* in isolation, but not the noun *magrebí*.

Hughes devotes several fruitful, enlightening pages (pp. 113–277) to showing and illustrating how ethnic slurs work, mainly related to how English speakers see outsiders. However, one misses many examples devoted to how outsiders refer to British/American people in a politically incorrect way and even how British people see American people and vice versa. With regard to how outsiders refer to British people the example of Sir Francis Drake (1540–1596) is enlightening. Spanish historians used to refer to him as *el pirata* Drake, whereas he is referred as *hero* or *corsair* by British writers. And this sort of thing also occurs among English speakers from both shores of the Atlantic Ocean. Indeed, the first war between the United States and Great Britain (1775–1783) is usually referred by the British themselves as *The American War of Independence* or *The War of American Independence*, and even

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[5] See http://www.laverdad.es/murcia/20080408/comarcas/aguilas-equipo-mineros-asturias-20080408.html (accessed 10 May 2010).

The American Rebellion, while Americans prefer *The American Revolutionary War* or *The American Revolution*. This is not a matter of a neutral way of naming an historic fact, since *The American Rebellion* could be considered politically incorrect and/or derogatory by Americans themselves.

In spite of the fact that Hughes's book presents its topic fastidiously, I have a couple of concerns, first, the omission of several references. I wonder why K. Allan and K. Burridge's books (1986 and 2006) are neither quoted nor alluded to, particularly since the second book devotes two chapters to censoring and political correctness (2006: 90–111 and 237–253). I also note no mention of Burgen's (1996) book, which is particularly interesting on how Europeans refer to themselves in a politically incorrect way.

This last book leads me to introduce my second concern. I find no pages devoted to how political correctness works from a cross-cultural viewpoint with regard to modes of address and courtesy treatments, since they vary from one culture (or language) to another. For instance, the use of the German noun *Fräulein* is nowadays considered politically incorrect when addressing any young unmarried woman or girl. Any politically correct German speaker has to say *Frau* instead of *Fräulein*, even if s/he positively knows that the woman in question is young or unmarried. Consequently, no German *Gelehrte*, who is proud of his political correctness, would dare address a young female student as *Fräulein*. Conversely, I would not dare to address a young female Spanish student as *señora*. Furthermore, in Germany the use of *Sie* instead of *du* is even regulated by law: 'children may expect strangers to use *Sie* from about fifteen; indeed, there is a law in many Länders that requires teachers to use *Sie* to students in the final few years of secondary school' (Allan & Burridge 2006: 139).

In a similar way, in Spanish, as in English translation, the use of the collocation *señor*+first name (e.g. *Señor Pedro*) is considered politically incorrect, or vulgar and impolite at least. The politically correct collocation is *señor*+family name (e.g. *Señor González*). In contrast, this collocation is usual and appropriate in Catalan (e.g. *Senyor Pere*). Consequently, the collocation which has to be avoided in Spanish and English has to be used in the Catalan language, if one wants to be politically correct in the three languages.

In spite of my concerns, I strongly recommend Hughes's book, not only for what it explicitly says but also for the many ideas it inspires.

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Metaphors Dead and Alive, Sleeping and Waking: A Dynamic View
Cornelia Müller
London: University of Chicago Press, 2008 (hardback), xix + 272 pp
Reviewed by Joshua Nash, *University of Adelaide*

This technical treatise on the historical placement of metaphor within linguistics, cognitive science and gesture studies is founded in two fundamental claims:

1. Verbal metaphors may be dead or alive, and
2. Verbal metaphors are generally both dead *and* alive.

Müller contends that '[m]etaphors are a specific form of cognitive activity, they have a triadic structure, they are modality independent, and they critically depend on the procedural character of language use' (p. 23). Müller's stance on the triadic structure is unique and is juxtaposed against the common dualistic notion of metaphors.

Dead metaphors, metaphors whose 'concrete sensory dimension is no longer perceived' (p. 3), are contrasted with alive metaphors, those metaphors (otherwise dead) that clash together and are created and formed using vocabulary. It is here that Müller claims alive metaphors arise and are activated – at the juncture of words, pictures and observations dead metaphors are kickstarted into action; this is the activation of metaphoricity. Dead metaphors are capable of stimulating elaboration of their source domain, be they verbal or pictorial metaphors. Sleeping metaphors demonstrate a low degree of activation while waking metaphors show a higher degree of metaphoricity. These are the major assumptions that are developed throughout this volume.

Because it covers a vast amount of precise conceptual and intellectual ground, Müller's work is a bold effort, aiming to fill several gaps in metaphor theory. It offers a refutation of what Müller claims is the traditional and rigid dead-alive metaphor dichotomy by proposing a more dynamic model of sleeping and waking metaphors. This model presents a synopsis of notions of metaphor from the classical period to the present and outlines how metaphors function in speech, text, gesture and images.

Drawing on up-to-date research in linguistics, psychology, semiotics, theories of consciousness and the philosophy of language and gesture, Müller examines the ways in which mixed metaphors sometimes appear to make sense and sometimes do not.

Müller's approach is fiercely empirical, claiming that the verbal, pictorial and gestural contexts of dead and alive conventionalized verbal metaphors can be measured in terms of the cognitive achievement of a speaker/writer or listener/reader, and further that metaphoricity is gradable. This gradation is classified according to the levels of activity of metaphors and the resultant 'dead or alive-ness' of the metaphoricity. Müller argues that terminology in metaphor theory and its ramifications for understanding meaning shift and the cultural vitality of metaphors help us appreciate the transparency of metaphors in relation to linguistic and gesture-based signs. The individual (sleeping and waking metaphors) versus the systems (dead, entrenched and novel metaphors) perspective on the semantic and pragmatic possibility of metaphors being activated forms the basis upon which her analysis proceeds. The dichotomy between metaphor production and comprehension of verbal metaphors and their properties also forms an integral aspect of a dynamic view of the psychology of metaphor.

This volume presents very recent and influential German treatments of metaphor that have until now been generally inaccessible to Anglophone scholars of metaphor. Very clear and precise chapter summaries and foci are provided (pp. 20–21), which are unnecessary to repeat here. The chapter constitutes autonomous arguments and can be read independently. The book as a whole forms a logical line of reasoning advocating a dynamic view on metaphors while refuting the mutually exclusive dichotomy of dead versus live metaphors, common points of contention in contemporary metaphor theory. This makes the work approachable for those already initiated into complex metaphor theory. However, as Müller's analysis is extremely technical, specific and detailed, it is less accessible to a general audience. If it had been made less detailed and not such a heavy read (without undermining the comprehensiveness and exhaustiveness with which Müller presents the data), this work could have been pitched to a broader yet still informed readership.

A critique of Müller's book can take several tacks, two of which are:

1. A philosophical critique of the placement of the volume within traditional (Western) approaches to metaphor theory
2. An empirical critique of the volume and its relevance to describing metaphor systems in non-European languages

The first approach was offered in a recent review (Angus 2010). This review will now take the second course.

While Müller's volume makes a strong argument concerning the role of metaphor in cognitive and linguistic functioning, what is often not made clear is the boundary between what is literal and what is metaphorical and whether this is culturally neutral or not. This is possibly the result of only analysing European languages, with relatively similar metaphor structures and assumptions. The question of the wider

applicability of this work is then raised: are Müller's empirical claims aiming to fill a large gap in the analysis of metaphors applicable to a broader cross-cultural theory of metaphor? Furthermore, are some or all of these metaphors, whether sleeping, awake or however one chooses to categorize them, language-independent? If so, what sort of data would falsify the findings of this work? As it is strongly concerned with metaphor in European languages and antiquarian philosophical perspectives that have arisen in the West, Müller does not clearly address the possibility that dissimilar results may arise during, for example, data collection in the fieldwork situation when documenting endangered or less documented languages. The lack of non-Western consideration of metaphor(icity) is one of the major shortcomings of this book.

Sometimes Müller claims rather simplistically that there exist scriptural and gestural metaphors that may materialise in different sign systems or in different modalities. What she does not consider is the possibility that the metaphor structure of non-European languages may not conform to the structures she is claiming exist in European languages, or at least in the languages she is looking at. This has serious implications for this book's methodological and theoretical assumptions, which are verging on being universalist. For example, if the metaphor systems of Austronesian languages (Bellwood, Fox & Tryon 2006) can be approached from a totally different perspective, the applicability and relevance of Müller's assumptions are questionable: the same results may not be garnered when applied to non-Western languages. Thus not only is her coverage incomplete empirically, but also from a philosophical point of view Müller has failed to raise the essential issue of the cultural specificity of metaphor.

Apart from this key shortcoming, *Metaphors Dead and Alive, Sleeping and Waking* is a worthwhile contribution to metaphor studies and one that hopefully will bring forth further research into understanding the importance of cross-cultural theories of metaphor in language documentation.

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